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The Application of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 13(a) in McDonald's Corp. v. Levine
INTRODUCTION

Under Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
counterclaim is compulsory if it arises from the same transaction
or occurrence comprising the subject matter of the original claim.1
A party who fails to assert a compulsory counterclaim is barred2
from raising the claim in any subsequent, independent action.
In contrast, the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure has no compulsory counterclaim provision. 3 Thus, any counterclaim omitted
from an Illinois proceeding may be raised as a separate action in
a later proceeding.
4
A recent Illinois appellate case, McDonald's Corp. v. Levine,
highlights the inconsistency between the federal and Illinois
approaches. The plaintiff, McDonald's Corp., brought a claim
which could have been raised as a counterclaim in a pending

1. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the
claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of
another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim
by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction
to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any
counterclaim under this Rule 13.
In Helle v. Brush, 2 111. App. 3d 951, 953, 275 N.E.2d 688, 690 (1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 53 IlM. 2d 405, 292 N.E.2d 372 (1973), the court defined a counterclaim as follows:
A counterclaim is in substance a complaint filed by defendant. It is not a
defense on the merits. It is an independent cause of action and must be complete within itself. In short a counterclaim stands on the same footing, and is to
be tested by the same rules, as if it were an independent action. (citations

omitted).
2. In Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 207 F.2d 483, 488 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912
(1953), the court explained the effect of finding that a claim is compulsory, stating: "If the
counterclaim is compulsory, it must be presented in connection with the main suit and,
upon failure to do so, the claimant is barred from seeking the same relief in an independent action." See also cases cited infra note 13.
3. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 2-608(a) (1981) (effective July 1, 1982).
4. 108 I1. App. 3d 732, 439 N.E.2d 475, reh'g denied, 108 Ill. App. 3d 746, 439 N.E.2d
485 (1982).
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federal proceeding. In determining whether plaintiffs claim
should have been dismissed, the court addressed two issues:
whether the claim was, by definition, a compulsory counterclaim
under federal Rule 13(a), and, if so, whether it should be barred
in the subsequent Illinois proceeding.
Resolution of the first issue was complicated by the fact that
federal courts have never precisely defined what makes a counterclaim compulsory. 5 This lack of a specific guideline allowed
the Illinois court some discretion in determining whether the
omitted claim was compulsory. After deciding that the claim was
compulsory, the court then had to decide whether to apply the
normal sanction under the federal rule and bar the claim. The
Levine court held that the claim was compulsory and that it was
barred in Illinois. 6 The Illinois Supreme Court denied the plain7
tiffs petition for leave to appeal.
After a brief overview of the federal compulsory counterclaim
provision and the counterclaim provision that is used in Illinois,
this note will discuss McDonald's Corp. v. Levine and compare
the Illinois appellate court's approach with the approaches used
by other state courts. The note will conclude by proposing a
standard Illinois courts should use to determine when an omitted
counterclaim is compulsory under Rule 13(a) and when it should
be barred in a subsequent Illinois proceeding.
BACKGROUND
Counterclaimsin FederalProceedings
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) derives from former
Equity Rule 30,8 although Rule 13(a) is broader in scope because

5.

Federal courts have never precisely defined when a claim arises from the same

"transaction or occurrence" to make it a compulsory counterclaim under FED. R. CIV. P.

13(a).
See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
6. 10811. App. 3d at 744,439 N.E.2d at 483-84.
7. McDonald's Corp. v. Levine, No. 81-151 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 1983).
8. The portion of Equity Rule 30 devoted to counterclaims provided:
The answer must state in short and simple form any counterclaim arising out
of the transaction that is the subject matter of the suit and may, without crossbill, set out any set-off or counterclaim against the plaintiff which might be the
subject of an independent suit in equity against him, and such set-off or counterclaim so set up shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the
court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit both on the original and
crossclaims.
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it covers legal as well as equitable proceedings. 9 Like its predecessor, Rule 13(a) is intended to eliminate multiple litigation of
disputes that arise out of common matters. 10 This purpose is
achieved in two ways. Where a counterclaim is compulsory, a
federal court will assert jurisdiction over the counterclaim under
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction." Jurisdiction is proper
even without an independent jurisdictional ground because the
counterclaim relates to the same transaction or occurrence comprising the subject matter of the original claim. 12 In addition,

When in the determination of a counterclaim complete relief cannot be
granted without the presence of parties other than those to the bill, the court
shall order them to be brought in as defendants if they are subject to its
jurisdiction.
9. The language of Rule 13(a) is also broader than Equity Rule 30. Under the former
equity rule, the counterclaim had to arise from the same "transaction" as the original
claim, whereas Rule 13(a) specifies that the counterclaim may arise from the same "transaction or occurrence." For a discussion of Equity Rule 30, see Note, Counterclaims
Under New FederalEquity Rule 30, 10 VA. L. REv. 598 (1929). For a comparison of the two
rules, see 3 J. MOORE, MoORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 13.03 (2d ed. 1983).

10. See, e.g., Southern Const. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57,60 (1962) (purpose of compulsory counterclaim is "to prevent multiplicity of action and to achieve resolution in a
single lawsuit of all duplicates arising out of common matters"). Accord, Warshawsky &
Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1977); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. G.P. Thompson Elec., Inc., 363 F.2d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1966); A.H. Grietzmacher & Co. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 194, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Ball v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 404 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Conn. 1975); Avondale Shipyards,
Inc. v. Propulsion Systems, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 341, 347 (E.D. La. 1971).
11. In Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974), the Supreme
Court stated: "If a counterclaim is compulsory, the federal court will have ancillary jurisdiction over it even though ordinarily it would be a matter for a state court."
The Seventh Circuit has defined the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as follows:
By this concept it is held that a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or
controversy as an entirety, and may, as an incident to deposition of a matter
properly before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case
of which it could not take cognizance were they independently presented.
Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (quoting C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 9, at 17 (1963)).
For example, where the plaintiffs original claim involves a federal question between
non-diverse parties and the defendant asserts a compulsory counterclaim based on state
law, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction allows the federal court to hear the counterclaim
despite the fact that the court would not have had subject matter jurisdiction over the
counterclaim if it had been brought independently. In contrast, where the original claim
is based on diversity jurisdiction, the federal court may hear the counterclaim whether it
is compulsory or not. In this latter situation, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction need
not be invoked.
12. Federal courts have consistently heard compulsory counterclaims under ancillary
jurisdiction. See, eg., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 699-700 (2d Cir.
1980) (in action by target corporation against tender offeror alleging violation of federal
securities laws, counterclaim to enjoin target from pursuing a planned merger with a
third corporation due to lack of valid business purpose allowed); Great Lakes Rubber
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the federal courts impose a sanction on a party who fails to
assert a compulsory counterclaim by barring further litigation of
13
the claim in any subsequent federal proceeding.
Federal Rule 13(b) governs in instances where a counterclaim
is deemed permissive rather than compulsory. 1 4 A permissive
counterclaim does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim and may be omitted or asserted at the
claimant's option. 15 If the claim is not asserted, no sanction is
imposed.' 6 A court, however, must have independent subject
7
matter jurisdiction in order to hear a permissive counterclaim.'
The distinction between compulsory and permissive counter-

Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Corp., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961) (in an action to enjoin
unfair competition under diversity jurisdiction, defendant's counterclaim founded on federal antitrust statutes was allowed even after original claim was dismissed for lack of
diversity; plaintiff was then allowed to reassert original claim as compulsory counterclaim); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 86 F.R.D. 694, 695 (E.D.N.C. 1980)
(counterclaims alleging abuse of process and defamation allowed in antitrust action);
Automated Datatron, Inc. v. Woodcock, 84 F.R.D. 408, 412 (D.D.C. 1979) (in diversity
action, counterclaim for recovery under a stock assignment agreement allowed although
third party which destroyed diversity was joined).
13. Federal courts consistently state that the sanction for not asserting a compulsory
counterclaim is a bar of the claim in later litigation. See, e.g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors,
Inc., 417 U.S. 468, 496 n.1 (1974); Mesker Bros. Iron Co. v. Donata Corp., 401 F.2d 275, 279
(4th Cir. 1968); Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir.
1967); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. G.P. Thompson Elec. Inc., 363 F.2d 181,184
(9th Cir. 1966); Lawhorn v. Atlantic Refining Co., 299 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1962);
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1961); Switzer Bros. v.
Locklin, 207 F.2d 483, 488 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1953).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) states: "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
15. See Hunter, One Year of Our Federal Rules, 5 Mo. L. REv. 1, 9 (1940), where the
author discusses the reasoning for distinguishing between compulsive and permissive
counterclaims, rather than making all counterclaims of whatever nature compulsory.
16. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661,671 (1943) (failure
to raise a permissive counterclaim does not render prior judgment res judicata with
respect to counterclaim). Accord Fowler v. Sponge Prod. Corp., 246 F.2d 223, 227 (1st Cir.
1957); Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 207 F.2d 483, 488 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912
(1953); Commerce Mfg. Co. v. Blue Jeans Corp., 146 F. Supp. 15, 17 (E.D.N.C. 1956);
American Surety Co. v. Fazel, 20 F.R.D. 110, 111 (S.D. Iowa 1956).
17. Revere Copper Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir.
1970) ("a permissive counterclaim under Rule 13(b) requires an independent ground of
federal jurisdiction since it does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the
original claim (citation omitted)"). Accord Harris v. Steinem, 571 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir.
1978); Sue & Sam Mfg. Co. v. B--S Constr. Co., 538 F.2d 1048, 1053 (4th Cir. 1976); Clark
v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974);
Board of Educ. v. Admiral Heating & Ventilation, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 343, 344 (N.D. Ill.
1981).

19831

McDonald's Corp. v. Levine

claims becomes important when ancillary jurisdiction provides
the basis for hearing the counterclaim and, further, when an
omitted counterclaim is asserted in a subsequent action.' 8
The distinction between the two types of counterclaims turns
on the question of whether the counterclaim arose "out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."' 19 To determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, therefore, the phrase "transaction or
occurrence" must be defined. Rather than define the phrase precisely,20 however, many courts have suggested applying standards or tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory. Four such tests have been used: 21 (1) If the issues of fact
and law are the same in both the claim and counterclaim, the
counterclaim is compulsory (identity of issues test).2 2 (2) If res
judicata would bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent
18. See Kennedy, Counterclaims Under FederalRule 13, 11 Hous. L. REV. 255, 260-61
(1974), where the author discusses the difference between labeling a counterclaim compulsory in the first action as opposed to the second:
The courts, however, have not generally seen fit to note that there are two different, polar contexts in which the words "arising out of the transaction or
occurrence" are called into play. One context is in the first litigation where the
defendant, faced with substantive or procedural barriers to raise a counterclaim
such as lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or the statute of limitations
argues that his claim overcomes the barriers and should be allowed because it
is a compulsory counterclaim arising out of the transaction or occurrence. The
plaintiff in this context argues that the claim does not so arise and that the
barriers do apply. A different context is presented in the second litigation, when
the defendant urges that the plaintiffs claim is precluded because it was a
compulsory counterclaim omitted in a prior litigation. The plaintiff in the
second litigation then takes the position that his claim did not arise out of the
prior subject matter, and the defendant argues that it did.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
20. Courts have not been able to precisely define "transaction or occurrence."See, e.g.,
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1925) ("transaction is a word of
flexible meaning"); Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 211, 213 (D.D.C. 1940) (" 'transaction'
and 'occurrence' probably mean whatever may be done by one person who effects another's rights and out of which a cause of action may arise"). In addition, the phrase has
been subject to an increasingly broad interpretation. Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l
Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1977); Albright v. Gates, 362 F.2d 928, 929 (9th Cir.
1966).
21. See Wright, Estoppel By Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern
Pleading,39 IOWA L. REV. 255, 270-71 (1954), reprintedin 38 MINN. L REV. 423, 438 (1954).
See also 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1410, at 42 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].

22. See, e.g., Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Lee, 168 F.2d 420, 423 (lst Cir. 1948) (claim by
defendant insurer against defendant insured heard because claim arose from the same
transaction or occurrence under the identity of issues test); Nachtman v. Crucible Steel
Co. of America, 165 F.2d 997, 999 (3d Cir. 1948) (in action to obtain a patent, counterclaim
attempting to enjoin plaintiff from exercising any rights under other patents held com-
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a compulsory counterclaim rule, the counterclaim is compulsory
(res judicata test).23 (3) If substantially the same evidence relates
to the plaintiff's claim as well as to the defendant's counterclaim,
the counterclaim is compulsory (same evidence test).24 (4) If there
is any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim,
25
the counterclaim is compulsory (logical relation test).
None of these tests has escaped criticism. Critics of the identity of issues test point out that the actual issues of the suit often
are not revealed until after the pleadings are completed. 26 The
res judicata test is considered too narrow, for under it a counterclaim would almost never be found compulsory. 27 The same evidence test is also cited as too narrow since a counterclaim may
be compulsory even though the evidence needed to prove the
opposing claim may differ significantly. 28 Conversely, the logical relation test has been described as overbroad and too uncertain in its application. 29 Of the four tests, the logical relation test

pulsory under the identity of issues test); Nye Rubber Co. v. V.R.P. Rubber Co., 81 F.
Supp. 635, 636 (N.D. Ohio 1948) (in patent infringement action, counterclaim for unfair
competition found not compulsory under the identity of issues test).
23. See, e.g., Big Cola Corp. v. World Bottling Co., 134 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1943)
(counterclaim for money due under a contract held permissive because it constituted an
independent action); Non-Ferrous Metals, Inc. v. Saramar Aluminum Co., 25 F.R.D. 102,
105 (1960) (counterclaim for fraud in diversity action which would require joinder of nondiverse parties held permissive under res judicata and identity of issues tests).
24. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 600,
602 (D. Mass. 1974) (in Lanham Act case counterclaim for defamation found permissive
under same evidence test); Kuster Lab. v. Lee, 10 F.R.D. 350, 351 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (in
trademark infringement suit, counterclaim for breach of distributorship agreement held
permissive); Williams v. Robinson, 1 F.R.D. 211, 213 (D.D.C. 1940) (in a suit alleging
adultry, counterclaim for defamation not compulsory under same evidence test).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12, 22 (2d Cir. 1979) (U.S. government's claims for overpayments under Medicare Act should be raised as compulsory
counterclaims in an injunction action brought to enjoin the government from suspending
payments); Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1977)
(in breach of contract action, claims asserted in another jurisdiction for services performed after the breach were found compulsory under the logical relation test); Great
Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961) (counterclaim
alleging unfair competition held compulsory under the logical relation test in antitrust
suit).
26. Wright, supra note 21, at 271, 38 MIN. L. REv. 423, 438; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 21, § 1410, at 44.
27. Meadows v. Charlie Wood, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 717, 721 (M.D. Ga. 1978) (absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule, a pleader would never be barred by res judicata from
asserting the claim in an independent action). See also WRIGHT &MILLER, supra note 21,
§ 1410 at 45; Wright, supra note 21, at 271, 38 MINN. L. REv. 423,439.
28. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1410, at 45; Wright, supra note 21, at 271-72, 38
MINN. L REv. 423,439.
29. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1410 at 47; Wright, supra note 21, at 275, 38
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is most often used by the courts.30 So long as a logical relation
exists between a claim and counterclaim, the counterclaim will
ordinarily be deemed compulsory, unless it falls within one of
31
Rule 13(a)'s stated exceptions.
The sanction of barring an unasserted compulsory counterclaim from subsequent litigation, while accepted by the courts, is
not expressly stated in the rule.32 In an effort to explain the rationale underlying the sanction, the courts have posited different
theories. Most courts suggest that the bar arises from res judicata principles. 33 This theory, however, requires a broad interpretation of the res judicata doctrine, which traditionally oper-

MINN. L. REV. 423, 442. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
384 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Mass. 1974) (the logical relation test can be uncertain in its

application and overbroad in its scope).
30. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1410, at 48. Some courts have applied all four
tests. See Whigham v. Beneficial Finance Co. of Fayetteville, Inc., 599 F.2d 1322, 1324

(4th Cir. 1979); Sue & Sam Mfg. Co. v. B-LS Constr. Co., 538 F.2d 1048, 1051-53 (4th Cir.
1976); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 86 F.R.D. 694, 697-99 (E.D.N.C.
1980); United States v. Taylor, 342 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Industrial Equip. &
Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578, 581 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
Some courts have suggested that different tests may be preferable in different circumstances. See Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (counterclaim found compulsory under logical relation test rather than res judicata
test because res judicata test was too narrow in this case); Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata
Nat'l Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1977) (counterclaim compulsory under the logical relation test because other tests, helpful in some cases, were too restrictive in this
case); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.
Mass. 1974) (counterclaim found permissive under the same evidence test; the logical
relation test was not used because it was too vague in this case).
31. Rule 13(a) provides four exceptions where a counterclaim need not be asserted
even if it definitely arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim:
(1) no counterclaim need be asserted if it was not mature at the time of serving the pleading; (2) no counterclaim need be asserted if it requires the presence of third parties over
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; (3) no counterclaim need be asserted if the
opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by which the
court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a judgment of that claim, and the pleader is
not stating any counterclaim under Rule 13; and (4) no counterclaim need be asserted if,
at the time the action is commenced, the counterclaim is the subject of another pending
action.
32. While the sanction is not stated in the rule, it was contemplated by the Advisory
Committee. The original committee notes of 1937 to Rule 13 stated: "7. If the action proceeds to judgment without the interposition of a counterclaim as required by subdivision
(a) of this rule, the counterclaim is barred."
33. Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1967);
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. G.P. Thompson Elec., Inc., 363 F.2d 181, 184 (9th
Cir. 1966); United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d 795, 805 (2d Cir. 1958); Speed
Prod. Co. v. Tinnerman Prod., 222 F.2d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 1955); Martin v. Morse Boulger
Destructor Co., 221 F.2d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 1955); Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 207 F.2d 483, 488
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1953).
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ates to bar subsequent litigation between the same parties on the
same cause of action, or on an issue already decided by the
court.3

4

Because a counterclaim is based on a different cause of

action than the original claim and usually involves different
issues, traditional res judicata principles do not provide an adequate rationale.
Other courts suggest that the bar derives from a "waiver" or
"estoppel" theory, which arises from the rule itself. The estoppel
theory, supported by commentators3 5 as well as courts,3 6 appears more equitable than a res judicata theory because, under
estoppel, the bar is not absolute. If a failure to bring the claim
37
was excusable, the claim can still be asserted.
While courts frequently state that failure to raise a compulsory
counterclaim results in subsequent preclusion, very few have
actually barred claims in subsequent actions. 38 One explanation
34. See 1B J. MOORE, supra note 9, § 405 (1), at 178-80, where it states that the term
res judicata ordinarily denotes two things respecting final judgment: first, that such a
judgment is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim; and second, that the judgment constitutes an estoppel between the same
parties as to matters that were litigated, although a claim in a subsequent action is different. This second principle is referred to as collateral estoppel. In Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955), the Court defined the difference between
these two principles:
[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment "on the merits" in a prior suit
involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same
cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand,
such a judgment precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause of
action as the second suit.
35. See Vestal, Claim Preclusion by Rule, 2 IND. LEG. F. 25, 43-44 (1968), where the
author discusses the barring of omitted compulsory counterclaims. For support of the
estoppel theory of precluding the counterclaim, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21,
§ 1417, at 96; Kennedy, supra note 18, at 250; Wright, supra note 21, at 260, 38 MINN. L.
REv. 423, 428.
36. See Dindo v. Whitney, 451 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1971); Dow Chemical Co. v. Melton
Corp., 281 F.2d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 1960); Reynolds v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 278
F. Supp. 331,333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); LaFollette v. Herron, 211 F. Supp. 919, 920 (E.D. Tenn.
1962) (courts all held the bar arises from "waiver" of the claim).
37. See Dindo v. Whitney, 451 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1971) (waiver or estoppel theory more
appropriate where first case was settled rather than tried because defendant may not
have known of right to counterclaim before settlement); Reynolds v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 278 F. Supp. 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (waiver or estoppel theory preferable
because it allows bringing of subsequent claim where first claim was handled by insurance company and no counterclaim was raised).
38. Only a handful of cases have barred a subsequent claim for failure to assert it as a
compulsory counterclaim in a prior suit. See New Britain Machine Co. v. Yeo, 358 F.2d
397 (6th Cir. 1966) (claim brought by patent licensee to recover royalties paid without
consideration barred because it was not asserted as a counterclaim in another federal
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for this is that Rules 13(a) and (b) encourage parties to raise all
related claims in the original action and thereby avoid the risk of
later preclusion. 39 Additionally, in the absence of a precise definition, courts have some flexibility in finding a counterclaim
compulsory. Thus, a court may apply a more restrictive interpretation of "transaction or occurrence" when a bar would be inappropriate, 40 and apply a liberal interpretation when the doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction is invoked so as to hear all related
claims in one proceeding. 41
Although the majority of states follow the federal example and
provide for compulsory counterclaims in some manner, 42 many

action brought by assignees of a corporation for unlicensed use of a patent); Cyclops
Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 616 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (claim by manufacturer
of an industrial machine against purchaser for costs of repairs barred when it should
have been asserted as a counterclaim in an earlier proceeding brought by purchaser for
costs and damages caused by the breakdown); Twin Disc. Inc. v. Lowell, 69 F.R.D. 64 (D.
Wis. 1975) (claim alleging breach of employment contract barred because it was an omitted counterclaim in an earlier proceeding brought to recover on guaranty of employment
contract); Kennedy v. Jones, 44 F.R.D. 52 (E.D. Va. 1968) (claim for injuries suffered in a
collision barred because not asserted as a counterclaim in an earlier proceeding brought
against the plaintiff and the plaintiffs employer over the same collision); Reconstruction
Fin. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Cody, 17 F.R.D. 397 (D. Wyo. 1955) (claim for fradulent
inducement to make loans to a sales company barred as to a defendant who had earlier
sought to foreclose a lien against assets of the sales company where the plaintiff claimed
an interest in the loans but raised no counterclaim). See also United States v. Eastport
S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958) (claim by U.S. for additional charter hire barredwhen it was not asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier Court of Claims
proceeding brought by the defendant for interest owed by U.S.) (decided under Court of
Claim rule 17(a) which is similax to Rule 13(a)).
39. WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 21, § 1417, at 100; Wright, supra note 21, at 264-65,
38 MINN. L. REv. 423, 432-33.
40. See Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (in patent infringement
suit, counterclaim under § 4 of the Clayton Act for monopoly expansion of the patent
was held permissive and therefore not barred in subsequent suit); Big Cola Corp. v. World
Bottling Co., 134 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1943) (in declaratory judgment action to find
contract void, court held that.an independent action could be brought for money due
under the contract because the claim was not compulsory); Dundee Wine & Spirits, Ltd. v.
Glenmore Distilleries Co., 238 F. Supp. 283, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (held that in an action for
breach of a franchise agreement a counterclaim for goods sold and delivered was not
compulsory).
All of these decisions have been criticized. See 3 J. MOoRE, supra note 9, § 13.13 nn.
22-25, at 13-76 to 13-78; Kennedy, supranote 18, at 262-63 nn. 29-31. Both authors criticize
these decisions as being too restrictive an interpretation of "transaction or occurrence."
Nonetheless, the cases reflect the tendency of courts to interpret the compulsory counterclaim provision more narrowly when a bar may result.
41. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 260-63, for a discussion of the polarized interpretations of compulsory counterclaims.
42. States having some type of compulsory counterclaim are: Alabama (ALA. R CIV.
P. 13(a)); Alaska (ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 13(a)); Arizona (ARITZ R. CIv. P. 13(a)); Arkansas (ARK.
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states consider the compulsory counterclaim unnecessary 43 and
make no such provision. 44 Illinois is one state that does not

compel counterclaims.
Counterclaimsin Illinois
The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 45 treats all counterclaims

as permissive 46 because, as the Illinois Supreme Court has stated,
a compulsory rule "might become most mischievous in its results,
for [the pleader] might be wholly unprepared to make out his
case for the want of testimony which at another time may be at

his command. 47 This permissive posture does not mean all claims
that could have been asserted as counterclaims may be litigated
in subsequent proceedings. The doctrine of collateral estoppel

R. CIv. P. 13(a)); Colorado (COLO. R. Civ. P. 13(a)); Delaware (DEL SUPER. Cr. (CIv.) R.
13(a)); Florida (FtA. R. Civ. P. 1.170); Georgia (GA_ Civ. P. ACT § 13 (1981)); Hawaii
(HAWAII R. CIv. P. 13(a)); Idaho (IDAHO R. Cir. P. 13(a)); Indiana (IND. R. T. P. 13(a)); Iowa
(IOWA R. Civ. P. 29); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-213 (1976)); Kentucky (KY. R. CIV. P.
13.01); Maine (ME. . Civ. P. 13(a)); Massachusetts (MASS. R. Cirv. P. 13(a)); Minnesota
(MINN. R. CIV. P. 13.01); Missouri (Mo. R. Crv. P. 55.32(a)); Montana (MONT. R. Ci. P.
13(a)); Nevada (NEV. R. Cirv. P. 13(a)); New Jersey (N.J.C. T. R. 4:7-1); New Mexico (N.M.
R. Civ. P. 13(a)); North Carolina (N.C. R. Civ. P. 13(a)); North Dakota (N.D. R. CIv. P.
13(a)); Ohio (OHIO Cirv. R. 13(a)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 272 (West 1975));
Rhode Island (R.I. R. CIv. P. 13(a)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-420 (1976));
South Dakota (S.D. COMp. LAws ANN. § 15-6-13(a) (1967)); Tennessee (TENN. R. CIV. P.
13.01); Texas (TEx. R. Civ. P. 97); Utah (UTAH R. Civ. P. 13(a)); Vermont (VT. . CIv. P.
13(a)); Washington (WASH. Sup. Or. R. 13(a)); West Virginia (W. VA. R. CIV. P. 13(a));
Wyoming (WYo. R. Civ. P. 13(a)).
43. The state of New York provides only for permissive counterclaims. N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
R. 3019(a) (McKinney 1974). An advisory committee note to § 3019 states: "After consideration of the problem, the advisory committee decided that adoption of a compulsory
counterclaim rule in New York might raise more difficulties than it would solve."
44. States without a compulsory counterclaim provision are: California (CAL CODE
Civ. PRoc. § 428.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983)); Connecticut (SUP. CONN. CIV. R. § 124);
Illinois (ILL CODE CIv. P. 2-608(a) (1981)); Louisiana (LA CODE CiV. PRoc. ANN. art. 1037
(West 1960 & Supp. 1983)); Maryland (MD.
R. Civ. 314); Michigan (MICH. GEN. CT.R. 203.2);
Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-69 (1972)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-834 (1979));
New Hampshire (N. H. REv. STAT. § 515:7 (1974)); New York (N.Y. CIv. PRAc. R. 3019(a)
(McKinney 1974)); Oregon (OR. R. CIV. P. 22); Pennsylvania (PA. R. CIV. P. 1046); Virginia
(VA. SuP. Or.R. 3:8); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. § 802.07 (1975)).
45. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-101 to 19c-101 (1981) (effective July 1, 1982).
46. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 2-608(a) (1981) states:
Any claim by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against
one or more codefendants, whether in nature of set-off, recoupment, cross-claim
or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract, for liquidated or unliquidated
damages, or for other relief, may be pleaded as a cross-claim in the action, and
when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim.
47. Ginther v. Duginger, 6 II. 2d 474, 480, 129 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1955).
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will always operate to bar litigation of omitted counterclaims
that deal with an issue resolved in prior proceedings.4 For
example, in a suit for declaratory judgment of title, collateral
estoppel will bar a subsequent action by the defendant for the
money value of the property, assuming the defendant lost the
original suit. This is because both suits would address the issue
of rightful ownership of the property. 49 Where the issues are not
the same, however, estoppel is not invoked and the counterclaim
may be heard.
Ordinarily, the difference between the Illinois and federal
counterclaim rules is inconsequential because the rules apply in
different jurisdictions.5 0 A problem does arise, however, if a
counterclaim omitted from a federal proceeding is subsequently
asserted in Illinois. The Illinois court must decide whether the
claim was a compulsory counterclaim and, if it was, whether
Illinois should follow the federal sanction and bar the claim. The
Illinois Appellate Court confronted this problem recently in
McDonald's Corp. v. Levine.51
MCDONALD'S CORP v. LEVINE
McDonald's Corporation filed suit in the Illinois Circuit Court
of DuPage County against William S. Levine, Gene Himmelstein, and Stephen Haberkorn (all McDonald's franchisees in

48. 1B J. MOORE, supra note 9, § 441(2), at 729-30. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
For a general discussion of the collateral estoppel doctrine, see Polasky, Collateral
Estoppel-Effects of PriorLitigation,39 IOWA L. REv. 217 (1954).
49. Hess v. Miller, 99 Ill. App. 225 (1901).
50. The two rules each operate in their own courts. The argument has been raised that

under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in which the Supreme Court determined that federal courts are bound to apply state law in adjudicating nonfederal questions involving substantive rules of law, Rule 13(a) should not compel a counterclaim in a
state that has no such rule when the counterclaim is not a federal question. This argument was rejected in G & M Tire Co. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 36 F.R.D. 440, 442
(N.D. Miss. 1964) where the court stated:
If plaintiffs' reliance on Erie is taken as requiring this court to be bound by the
[permissive] Mississippi counterclaim statute . . . it

-

.

. must fail. While the

various issues to which the Erie doctrine is applicable are not free from doubt,
the one presented here is clearly one of procedure for the orderly administration
of federal courts, and is not affected by the different but related rule established
by the state for the orderly administration of its courts.
For a discussion of Erie and Rule 13(a) see generally Note, The Erie Doctrine and
FederalRule 13(a), 46 MINN. L REv. 913 (1962).
51. 108 Ill. App. 3d 732, 439 N.E.2d 475, reh'gdenied, 108 Ill. App. 3d 746, 439 N.E.2d
485(1982).
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Arizona), and their Illinois attorney. In its six-count complaint,
McDonald's alleged that the defendants had illegally recorded
private conversations in violation of the Illinois Eavesdropping
Act 52 and had stolen certain privileged documents from McDonald's corporate offices. These violations were alleged to have
occurred during discovery proceedings in a prior antitrust action
brought by the present defendants against McDonald's in a federal district court in Arizona. 53 At the time McDonald's filed the
state suit, the federal case was still pending.54 The Illinois Cir55
cuit Court dismissed all six counts of McDonald's complaint.
Two counts, count three alleging conspiracy and conversion and
count four alleging use of stolen documents, were dismissed
because they should have been brought as compulsory counter56
claims in the federal proceeding.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District
reinstated one of the counts previously dismissed because of the
statute of limitations, 57 but affirmed the dismissal of the other
five counts. 5 As to counts three and four, the appellate court
held that the claims should have been raised as compulsory
counterclaims in the federal proceeding because they were logically related to the federal claims; 59 the use of evidence in the
federal proceeding was the violation charged in the state proceeding; and the claims all arose from the franchise relationship.60 As a result, the claims were barred.
McDonald's petitioned for rehearing,6 ' claiming that federal
Rule 13(a) was only a procedural rule and therefore had no extraterritorial effect. The corporation urged the court to follow state

ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1 to 14-9 (1981).
53. Levine v. McDonald's Corp., No. 77-601 (D. Ariz. settled August 11, 1983).
54. The federal case was settled on August 11, 1983.
55. 108 IM. App. 3d at 736-37, 439 N.E.2d 478-79. Counts I and II were dismissed
because of the running of the statute of limitations. These two counts also included the
claims of two McDonald's employees who were allegedly damaged by the alleged eavesdropping violations. The claims were dismissed as to them because they were not real
parties in interest. Court V's dismissal was not dealt with by the court because it was not
appealed. Count VI was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
56. 108 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 439 N.E.2d at 479.
57. Id. at 739, 439 N.E.2d at 480.
58. Id. at 745-46, 439 N.E.2d at 484-85.
59. Id. at 744, 439 N.E.2d at 483-84.
60. Id.
61. McDonald's raised other issues as well in its appeal for rehearing. McDonald's
argued that because its claims were filed in Illinois while the federal action was still
pending, even if it were a compulsory counterclaim it should not be barred because there
52.
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procedural rules and permit the claim. 62 In rejecting this argument, the court held that Rule 13(a) was more than just a procedural rule. It could operate in either of two ways: either by
defining the scope of the original action, thereby requiring the
application of res judicata principles, or by setting up an estoppel
against a party who did not comply with its terms, thereby barwas no judgment and, therefore, no res judicata principles could affect the subsequent
claim. The court rejected this contention, holding that while some courts have reached
this conclusion those decisions were inconsistent with the purpose of 13(a) since they
permitted duplicative litigation. Id. at 749, 439 N.E.2d at 487.
Rejecting this argument by McDonald's seems proper even if the court had determined
that prior omitted counterclaims could be raised. While some state courts have refused to
bar a claim that should have been raised as a compulsory counterclaim in a pending
federal proceeding because res judicata principles did not apply (see, e.g., M.C. Mfg. v.
Texas Foundries, 519 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976);
Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. Eagle Express Co., 346 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961); Hubbs v.
Nichols, 298 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. 1957)), this approach sets up a "race to judgment" in the
two proceedings and is unwise. The better tactic is for the state court to abate the subsequent case pending the federal court decision. (See, e.g., Conrad v. West, 98 Cal. App. 2d
116, 219 P.2d 477 (1950) (court abated state action pending the outcome of the federal
action)). This approach prevents the race to judgment and gives the first decision res
judicata effect. Even if the second action were brought in a state court that did not bar
omitted counterclaims, the prior decision may have collateral estoppel effect over the subsequent proceeding. Once the federal proceeding reaches judgment, the state is left to
determine the issue Levine addresses, namely, whether an omitted counterclaim from a
prior federal proceeding should be barred. See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, §
1418, at 103-08; Note, Concurrent Jurisdictionas Affected by the Compulsory Counterclaim Rule, 10 Sw. L.J. 402, 409-12 (1956). See generally Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47
IOWA L. REv. 11 (1961) (all supporting the abatement approach).
McDonald's also contended in its petition for rehearing that because it did not know of
the alleged theft of the documents at the time it answered in the federal proceedings,
these counterclaims could not have been compulsory. McDonald's argued that these
claims fell within Rule 13(a)'s exception for claims not mature "at the time of serving the
pleading." (See supra notes 1, 31). The appellate court rejected this claim, holding that
because McDonald's had filed a counterclaim in the federal proceeding, it waived the
Rule 13(a) exception. In the court's view, McDonald's should have asserted the entire
claim as a compulsory counterclaim in the federal proceeding. 108 Ill. App. 3d at 749-50,
439 N.E.2d at 487. Furthermore, the court stated that the dismissal of the federal counterclaim in the federal court caused the claims to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Id. Discussion of this holding is beyond the scope of this article.
62. 108 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 439 N.E.2d at 485.
See Wright, supra note 21, at 268-69, 38 MINN. L. REv. 423, 435-36, where the author
discusses this argument and concludes that while the rule is procedural, the effects of the
rule are substantive and should have extra-territorial effect.
See also WRIGHT & MaLEI, supra note 21, § 1417, at 101-02; Note, Failureto Plead Federal Compulsory Counterclaim as Bar to State Suit, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 446, 449-50 (1948)
(while Rule 13(a) is a procedural rule, it lays down a new substantive rule of res judicata
which bars assertion of omitted federal counterclaim in a state court). But see Comment,
Effect of FederalCompulsory CounterclaimRule on Subsequent Ohio Action-Res Judicata, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 252-53 (1960) (conclusion that bar arises from res judicata
avoids difficult problem of determining if the federal rule is one of procedure or sub-
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ring a defendant from bringing the claim in any federal or state
63

court.

McDonald's argument that the claims were not compulsory
counterclaims was also rejected by the court.6 4 The court concluded that the district court in Arizona would have had to consider the manner in which the documents were obtained in order
to determine the admissibility of their contents. Because the circumstances of acquisition were also central to McDonald's
claims, the court held that the federal and state actions both
65
involved the same evidence, and thus were logically related.
Alternatively, the court held that the claims were logically related
66
because they arose out of the franchisee relationship. McDonald's petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to appeal
67
this decision, but leave was denied.
DECISIONS FROM OTHER STATE COURTS

In concluding that McDonald's claims should be barred, the
Levine court relied on four decisions from other states involving
68
counterclaims that were omitted from prior federal proceedings.
While all four courts reached the same conclusion as the Levine
court, the facts and rationales of the cases differ. Only five
reported decisions have addressed this issue and each will be
69
examined.
stance) [hereinafter cited as Subsequent Ohio Action].
63. 108 M1.App. 3d at 747,439 N.E.2d at 485.
64. Id. at 747-48, 439 N.E.2d at 486.
65. Id. at 748, 439 N.E.2d at 486.
66. Id.
67. McDonald's v. Levine, No. 81-151 (Ill. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 1983).
68. 108 Ill. App. 3d at 747,439 N.E.2d at 486. The four cases which also barred a claim
for failing to assert it as a counterclaim in a federal action were: London v. City of Philadelphia, 412 Pa. 496, 194 A.2d 901 (1963); Home v. Woolever, 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d
378 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960); Meacham v. Haley, 38 Tenn. App. 20, 270
S.W.2d 503 (1954); Jocie Motor Lines v. Johnson, 231 N.C. 367, 57 S.E.2d 388 (1950). The
Levine court also cited Conrad v. West, 98 Cal. App. 2d 116, 219 P.2d 477 (1950) in support, which held that the state proceeding should be abated pending the outcome of the
federal proceeding, See supranote 61.
69. The cases discussed below all occurred in states that did not have compulsory
counterclaim provisions at the time of the decisions. No reported decision from a state
having its own compulsory counterclaim provision has confronted a claim that should
have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in a federal proceeding. It is likely that
such a claim would be barred since "it would seem reasonable to implement the public
policy of both" federal and state rules by barring the claim. (Vestal, supranote 35, at 51.)
See also Chapman v. Aetna Finance, 615 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal court determined to bar a federal claim omitted as a compulsory counterclaim from a prior Georgia

1983]

McDonald's Corp. v. Levine

A North Carolina court confronted this issue for the first time
in Jocie Motor Lines v. Johnson.70 Jocie Motor Lines ("Jocie")
sued Johnson to recover money it paid to Johnson pursuant to a
district court order. The federal suit involved a traffic accident
which occurred in Virginia. Johnson was sued because he owned
the truck, and he joined Jocie, which had leased the truck from
him at the time of the accident, as a codefendant. 71 After Johnson and Jocie were found jointly and severally liable in the federal proceeding, 72 Jocie brought suit against Johnson in North
Carolina.
The North Carolina court held that the claim should have
been brought as a compulsory counterclaim in the prior federal
proceeding because the same transaction or occurrence gave rise
to both claims. 73 By failing to assert a timely counterclaim, the
court reasoned, Jocie had lost its opportunity to recover any
money from Johnson. The court held that the first judgment was
res judicata on the issues that could have been raised, 74 and that
the federal court's decision must receive full faith and credit.75
A Tennessee Appellate Court reached a similar result in Meachain v. Haley.76 Haley had filed a claim against the assets of a
bankrupt corporation in a prior federal proceeding with Meachain the bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy court, in construing a contract between Haley and the bankrupt corporation, held
Haley's claim subordinate to the claims of other creditors because
the contract lacked proper consideration. 77 Rather than assert a
counterclaim in the bankruptcy action, Meacham brought suit in
78
Tennessee accusing Haley of fraud.

state proceeding to further the policies of both courts). The issue addressed in Levine and
the cited cases differs, however, because the policy of both courts is not being furthered

by the bar.
70. 231 N.C. 367,57 S.E.2d 388(1950).
71.

Hodges v. Johnson, 52 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Va. 1943). Johnson was engaged in a

trucking business in North Carolina, but had no certificate from the Interstate Commerce
Commission permitting him to haul commodities in interstate commerce. Johnson

entered into an agreement with Jocie Motor Lines, which did have such a certificate, to
lease Jocie his trucks so as to haul under Jocie's certificate. Johnson never exercised any
control
72.
73.
74.

over the operation of such trucks.
Id. at 492.
231 N.C. at 371, 57 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 372, 57 S.E.2d at 391.

75. Id. at 373, 57 S.E.2d at 392.
76.
77.
78.

38 Tenn. App. 20, 270 S.W.2d 503 (1954).
Id. at 26, 270 S.W.2d at 505.
Id. at 26-27, 270 S.W.2d at 505-06.
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In affirming the lower court's dismissal of Meacham's claim,
the appellate court stated that the claim should have been
asserted as a compulsory counterclaim during the bankruptcy
proceeding because it arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the federal claim.7 9 The court barred Meacham's claim,
invoking, as did the North Carolina court in Jocie, res judicata
principles. 80 The Meacham court added that estoppel principles
also worked to bar the claim. 81
Another decision relied upon in Levine was Horne v. Woolever
from the Ohio Supreme Court. 82 Like Jocie, the case involved an

automobile accident that was the subject matter of an earlier
federal suit.8 3 Woolever had sued Home in federal court and,
rather than assert a counterclaim, Home brought suit in the
state court. When the parties settled the federal court suit, Home
attempted to pursue his own state claim.8 4
The Ohio court barred Home's subsequent claim, holding that
it should have been raised as a compulsory counterclaim.85 The
court reasoned that Rule 13(a) has the effect of making a judgment on the merits res judicata to both the cause of action
asserted in the petition and the cause of action that should have
been asserted by the counterclaim.86 The court held that to the
extent judgments are res judicata in the federal court, they are
8
also res judicata in Ohio courts.

7

The final case cited for support in Levine was London v. City
of Philadelphia.8 London sued in state court to recover damages
for injuries he incurred in a traffic collision with a city vehicle.
The city had already been sued in federal court by the passengers in London's automobile. London was joined as a thirdparty defendant in the federal proceeding, but did not raise a
counterclaim against the city. He and the city were each found

79. Id. at 37, 270 S.W.2d at 510.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 38-39, 270.S.W.2d at 511.
82. 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d 378 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960).
83. Id. at 179, 163 N.E.2d at 380. The prior federal proceeding was initiated by Wool-

ever in an Ohio state court, but removed by Home to the Northern District of Ohio. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 183, 163 N.E.2d at 382-83.
86. Id. at 181, 163 N.E.2d at 381.82.
87. Id. at 183, 163 N.E.2d at 383. For a discussion of Horne, see generally Subsequent
Ohio Action, supra note 62.
88. 412 Pa. 496, 194 A.2d 901 (1963).
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fifty percent responsible for the collision. 9 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania barred the subsequent state claim, 90 stating
that although Pennsylvania courts are not bound by federal procedural rules, London's claim was now res judicata, which was a
matter of substantive law.91
The courts in all four cases concluded that a compulsory counterclaim omitted in federal suits should be barred in subsequent
state actions. One state court, however, has declined to follow the
majority approach. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in Phoenix
Co. v. Haney,92 allowed an omitted counterclaim against an
insurance company to be asserted in state court. In a prior
declaratory judgment action in federal court, the insurance company sought to establish that because Haney had violated the
terms of his policy, coverage for fire damage to his property had
lapsed.93 Haney raised no counterclaim in the federal proceeding.
When Haney asserted his claim in the state court, the insurance company argued that the claim was an omitted compulsory
counterclaim and should be barred. 94 Without deciding whether
the claim was compulsory, the court found that res judicata did
not apply because the issue of damages had never been litigated.
The court stated that whether the claim should have been raised
as a compulsory counterclaim in the federal proceeding was inconsequential. 95 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
96
in this case.

ANALYSIS

Of the preceding five decisions, the Mississippi court's opinion
is least persuasive and should not be followed. 97 The Mississippi
court rested its decision on res judicata principles alone without
ever examining other possible rationales for barring the claim.

89. Id. at 498, 194 A-2d 901-02.
90. Id. at 498, 194 A.2d at 902.

91. Id. at 498, 194 A.2d at 902-03.
92. 235 Miss. 60, 108 So. 2d 227, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1959).

93. Id. at 65, 108 So. 2d at 228.
94. Id. at 66, 108 So. 2d at 229.
95. Id. at 70-71, 108 So. 2d at 231.

96. 360 U.S. 917 (1959).
97. The Phoenix Co. v. Haney decision has been criticized by commentators. See, e.g.,
Vestal, supra note 35, at 54 (the decision "is clearly wrong and clearly inconsistent with
the purpose of the compulsory counterclaim rule"); Comment, 73 HARV. L REV. 1410, 1413

(1960) (Rule 13(a) defines the scope of the judgement to which the full faith and credit
statue shall apply so the Phoenix Co. decision was incorrect).
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As subsequent courts and commentators have indicated, several
persuasive reasons exist for such a bar.98 Apart from res judicata arguments, some have suggested that the bar derives from
application of the "full faith and credit" statute. 99 Under this
law, the argument goes, the state court should accord the federal
judgment full faith and credit by barring a claim that would be
barred in the federal court. 100 Others have supported the alternative theory suggested in Levine, that failure to raise the claim
creates a personal waiver that follows a litigant wherever he
attempts to sue. 101 A fourth theory, based on the rule of comity,102 suggests that the state court follow the federal rule of precluding the claim out of deference and respect. 10 3
While the Levine court correctly decided to bar the omitted
compulsory counterclaim, its conclusion with respect to which
test to use is questionable. The court applied the logical relation
test in concluding that McDonald's claim was a compulsory
counterclaim. 10 4 This test, which has been criticized as overly
broad, 0 5 proved too broad for the circumstances presented in
Levine. Unlike the federal courts which use this test often to hear
98. See, e.g., 108 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 439 N.E.2d at 485; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
21, § 1417, at 101-02; Wright, supra note 21, at 268, 38 MINN. L. REV. 423, 435-36. See supra
note 62 and accompanying text.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) states:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory,
or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation
of the Clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a
certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
100. See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 35, at 51; Comment, supra note 97, at 1413. But see
Chapman v. Aetna Finance, 615 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1980) (federal court determined to
bar a compulsory counterclaim omitted from an earlier Georgia proceeding under principle of comity; the rule is essentially procedural and not applicable under full faith and
credit statute).
101. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1417, at 102; Wright, supra note 21,
at 268, 38 MiNN. L. REv. 423, 435-36.
102. A simple definition of comity was stated by the court in Doescher v. Estelle, 454
F. Supp. 943, 948 (N.D. Tex. 1978), appeal dismissed, 597 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1979): "Judicomity is the principle in accordance with which courts of one jurisdiction will give effect
to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation,
but out of deference and respect."
103. See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 35, at 51.
104. 108 Ill. App. 3d at 743-44, 439 N.E.2d at 483-84.
105. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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claims under their pendent jurisdiction, 06 Illinois courts need
consider the issue of whether a claim is compulsory only when
deciding whether the claim must be barred. If an Illinois court
were to impose this sanction whenever a subsequent claim bore
some logical relation to a prior claim, the results would, indeed,
be harsh. Even those federal courts which use the logical relation
10 7
test apply it cautiously when the sanction of bar could result.
Application of the logical relation test produces results which
are contrary to Illinois' own procedural policy. Because Illinois
does not have a compulsory counterclaim provision, Illinois
courts ordinarily do not bar claims which could have been raised
as a counterclaim in a prior state court proceeding. Use of a more
restrictive test would therefore be more consistent with Illinois
policy. Additionally, use of a more restrictive test would not violate federal policy because federal courts have recognized that
different tests may be more applicable in different situations.108

The res judicata test, however, is inappropriate for Illinois
courts for the same reason it is inappropriate in the federal
courts: it is too restrictive. 10 9 Res judicata principles apply
regardless of whether a counterclaim is deemed compulsory.
Thus, if this test were used, application of the federal rule would
be totally unnecessary. 110 The identity of issues test is also inappropriate. Under this test, a claimant could bring a subsequent
claim that actually arose from the same "transaction or occurrence" as the original claim, as long as the claims involved different issues of law."' In short, this test is not quite broad
enough.
106. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1417, at 100, where the authors state that
the great bulk of litigation concerning whether a particular claim is compulsory involves
cases in which the claim has been pleaded, but a determination of whether it is compulsory is necessary because of the consequences that decision may have on questions of
jurisdiction, venue, jury trial, right of removal, or appealability.
107. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
110. In Illinois, even though no counterclaims are compulsory, a subsequent claim
will be barred if it involves the same issue decided in the prior suit under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
111. WRIGHT& MILLER supra note 21, § 1410, at 44-45, states that a strict application of
the identity of issues test would yield inconsistent results with many authoritative counterclaim decisions. As an example, Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593
(1926), is cited. In that case, the plaintiffs claim focused on the question of whether the
defendants were violating the antitrust laws by refusing to give plaintiff ticker tape service, and the defendant's counterclaim focused on whether the plaintiff was purloining
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RECOMMENDATION

Illinois courts should use the same evidence test. This test
directly supports the purpose of Rule 13(a); it eliminates multiple
litigation by barring those claims which would require one court
to review the same evidence that another court previously examined. Furthermore, the test is consistent with Illinois policy. If it
were used, fewer claims would be barred for failure to assert
them as counterclaims." 2 The same evidence test is also fair to
litigants. It acts to bar claims that a litigator should recognize as
compulsory counterclaims because the same evidence is directly
involved. At the same time, however, the test does not act to bar
claims that have only a tangential relation to the original claim. Finally,
the same evidence test furthers principles of comity and full faith
and credit by affording state courts a means to give as full a
reading to the federal compulsory counterclaim rule as have fed11 3
eral courts.
Application of the same evidence test would have yielded consistent results in the foregoing state cases in which the issue of
omitted counterclaims was actually examined. Three of these
cases, Jocie Motor Lines u. Johnson, London v. City of Philadelphia, and Home v. Woolever, involved claims arising from traffic collisions," ' and the evidence presented in each of the prior
quotations from the defendant's exchange. Even though the issues were very different,
the court held this counterclaim compulsory under Equity Rule 30 since it arose from the
same transaction as the plaintiffs claim.
This authoritative case would have reached the same conclusion under the same evidence test. (See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text). The plaintiff's antitrust
dlaims for restraint of trade would have involved evidence of the plaintiff's alleged

wrongful actions. This evidence would have been used by the defendant to show that it
did not violate the antitrust laws when it refused to trade with the plaintiff. This evidence
would also have supported the counterclaim. The court recognized this when it stated

that the connection between the claim and counterclaim was so close that "it only needs
the failure of the [claim] to establish a foundation for the [counterclaim]." Id. at 610.
112. For examples of counterclaims that were asserted under the logical relation test

but that would have been barred under the narrower same evidence test, see Albright v.
Gates, 362 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1966) (in a suit for slander over statements made regarding
the plaintiff's sales of oil securities, defendants counterclaimed for amount paid for secur-

ities); G & M Tire Co. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 36 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. Miss. 1964) (in a
suit alleging antitrust violations by plaintiffs supplier regarding defendants conspiring
with other defendants to market products at lower prices than those charged to plaintiff,
counterclaim by defendant for indebtedness arising from the business relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant).
113. Several federal courts have applied the same evidence test. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 71-72, 83-84, 89 and accompanying text.
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McDonald's Corp. v. Levine

federal actions focused upon who was at fault. The subsequent
claims were correctly labeled compulsory because evidence involving fault would also have to be presented in the state courts.
The same evidence tests would produce identical results in
Meacham v. Haley. There, the state court suit was based on
fraud in a contract. Since the federal bankruptcy court had
already examined the legitimacy of the contract, the state court
correctly labeled the fraud claim a compulsory counterclaim
because it involved the same evidence considered in the bank115
ruptcy proceeding.
Only in Phoenix Co. v. Haney would application of the same
evidence test have permitted the state court plaintiff to proceed
with his claim. In Haney, the insurance company initiated the
federal action to determine whether the policy holder had violated the policy. In contrast, the state suit was brought by the
policy holder for property damage suffered in a fire.1 6 Because
evidence as to whether a policy holder violated his policy differed
from evidence of fire damage, the Mississippi court could have
permitted the claim under the same evidence test. Thus, the
court's rationale for allowing the claim could have been that the
claim was not compulsory. Instead, the court stated summarily
that whether the claim was compulsory or permissive was inconsequential.
If the Illinois Appellate Court had applied the same evidence
test in Levine, the claims most likely would have been heard.
The federal claims involved evidence concerning McDonald's
alleged antitrust violations, while the claims brought in the Illinois court involved evidence concerning the alleged theft of documents. Although the Illinois claims did arise out of evidence
that was at issue in the federal proceeding, the evidence necessary to prove the state claims and the federal antitrust claims
was quite different. 117 Under the same evidence test, the state
claim would not have been labeled compulsory and would not
115. See supranotes 77-78 and accompanying text.
116. See supranotes 93-94 and accompanying text.
117. The Levine court did come close to applying the same evidence test in its supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing. The court felt that the federal court would have
considered the circumstances under which the documents were obtained in order to

determine the admissibility and credibility of the evidence. The court stated that "[the
fact that the two actions will involve the same evidence is one reason for treating the
second action as a compulsory counterclaim." 108 Ill.
App. 3d at 732, 439 N.E.2d at 486.
The Levine court was not applying the same evidence test, however. It cited to Great
Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961) to support its
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have been dismissed.118
CONCLUSION

Illinois courts should bar claims omitted as compulsory counterclaims from prior federal proceedings. The principles of res
judicata, comity, estoppel, and full faith and credit warrant this
result. In addition, the goal of eliminating multiple litigation is
furthered by applying Rule 13(a)'s sanction in other jurisdictions.
Since Illinois does not have a compulsory counterclaim rule,
Illinois courts need not determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory except in situations where the claim was omitted
from a prior federal proceeding. If Illinois courts were to use the
relatively restrictive same evidence test, as opposed to the logical
relation test, to make this determination, the results would be
more equitable. They also would be more in keeping with Illinois'
own policy not to bar subsequently asserted counterclaims, except
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
If the same evidence test had been applied to the claims in
McDonald's Corp. v. Levine, the court most likely would have
concluded that the claims were not compulsory counterclaims.
The Illinois Supreme Court, which declined to review this case,
should address this issue at the next opportunity.
MARK E. SHURE

statement. There, the counterclaim was held compulsory under the logical relation test
because "[wihere multiple claims involve many of the same factual issues .. . or where
they are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties, fairness and considerations of convenience and of economy require that the counterclaimant be permitted
to maintain his cause of action." In the Levine court's view, since the same evidence is
involved in both proceedings, the claims are logically related.
This is not the same as finding the counterclaim compulsory under the more restrictive
same evidence test. While the federal court may have had to determine the circumstances
of the documents' acquisition in order to determine whether to admit the documents into
evidence, those determinations in no way would help the court to examine the franchisees' claims of antitrust violations. On the other hand, the circumstances of acquisition
would be the main issue in the Illinois proceeding, and would require much more evidence on that point than would the federal court's determination of admissibility. Hence,
the same evidence test would not be met because the same evidence does not relate to

both claims.
118. This does not address the alternate theory presented in Levine, namely, that the
claims were barred by res judicata. See supra note 61.

